Abstract
During 2008 the Lukashenko government continued its ‘pendular’
policy of trying to manage relations with Russia to the east and the
European Union to the west so as to extract the most favourable political
and economic deal possible. In October 2008, shortly after the September
parliamentary elections, the EU said it was lifting travel sanctions
against senior Belarus officials for a six month period, during which it
would monitor progress towards a ‘full-scale political dialogue’.
The Minsk government responded that it wanted sanctions to be eliminated
completely after April 2009 and for other additional steps to be taken,
including the restoration of the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences
(GSP), wider trade liberalisation and an emphasis on the ‘economic
component’ in collaboration between the two sides. While seeking an
opening towards the EU, the President remained opposed to NATO. In an
interview with AFP news agency in November 2008 he accused NATO of
provoking a ‘mini arms race’. ‘You fly NATO planes near
our country’s borders. Why? We begin strengthening our air defences.
This is pushing a mini arms race’ he said. The President added that
Belarus was considering buying short-range Russian Iskander missiles to
step up its air defences but that this should not cause concern in Europe. In
terms of relations with Russia, there were also a series of issues. One
was Minsk’s ongoing concern over the likely increase in gas prices
charged by Gazprom. Furthermore, while Belarus appeared lined up to support
Moscow’s position opposing the US missile shield in Eastern Europe,
its position on the Russian invasion of Georgia in August appeared more
ambiguous. The Belarus Parliament has failed to respond to various
requests from Russia that it formally recognise the separatist, Russian-backed
Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Despite Belarus’
poor diplomatic and military relationship with the US and the EU, its external
and internal security remained reasonably stable. The opposition to the
government remained relatively weak, cowed by the weight of the security
services and with only tenuous unity among the different political
groupings. Strong economic growth had to some extent softened anti-government
protests over the lack of democracy but with a hard landing in prospect
for 2009, new strains could be expected to emerge. Belarus’ arms
trade continued to be scrutinised by the international community. Reports of
arms sales to rogue or strongly anti-US states (among them Venezuela and
Iran) were watched closely in Western capitals. Suspicions had emerged
after Belarus purchased the technology without the necessary support
systems or the need. The international community still regards Belarus as a
prominent conduit for illegal arms trading. The Belarusian defence
industry continues to be dominated by state-run defence enterprises such
as Beltechexport and Belvneshpromservis. The latter is a significant
player in Belarusian arms exports and modernisation.
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