Abstract
Anti-government sentiment appears to be growing, fuelled by the September 2008
Duweiqa rock slide, which killed up to 100 people, and the collapse of a
building in Alexandria. Leaders of opposition parties and NGOs have
announced intentions to bring a lawsuit against top government figures for
criminal negligence in Duweiqa. There is a general perception of
inadequate safety standards and corruption, with much of the blame
directed at the government. According to a Pew Global Attitudes survey, 13%
of Egyptians were satisfied with their government, against 45% in Jordan
and 79% in Kuwait. However, if the parliamentary election is anything to
go by, the opposition parties filing the lawsuit against the government do
not have enough popular backing to make any real impact. One event that
could make an impact is an Islamist uprising. Al-Qaeda' s number two, Ayman
al-Zawahiri, who is Egyptian, recently said the Duweiqa incident
highlighted the corruption of Muslim governments. Also, the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) seems to be moving closer to the secular leftist opposition,
with Chairman Mahdi Akef meeting with the al-Wafd party in late September
2008 to tell him that serious change is necessary in Egypt and that they
should work together against corruption. Any political deterioration could
trigger a fall in the relatively strong forecast growth rate of 5.4%, as
would a more-severe-than-expected world recession. Based on the government' s
apparent commitment to sustaining growth, it may opt to cut taxes.
However, this would affect an already strained fiscal situation. Egypt
continues to be a major recipient of US foreign military aid, which it uses to
acquire largely USmade military equipment as part of a bid to modernise
its armed forces. The latest acquisition of M1-A1 Abrams tanks is an
example of the ongoing importance of this. Egypt boasts what is, for the
region, an extensive military equipment manufacturing industry, although
it has no armaments design industry to speak of. Its defence industry
remains largely dependent on co-production deals, again, primarily with
the US. Egypt’s military expenditure is likely to be constant,
providing Cairo remains in the US’ favour, and as long as the US
does not reprioritise substantially its regional defence subsidy
priorities. This appears unlikely, however: Cairo and Washington share
many of the same beliefs regarding Egypt’s security concerns. US
pressure for political reform in Egypt is likely to remain limited because the
US does not want another Islamist government in the region. This rationale
has seen the US continue to bolster the Mubarak government through
explicit support and extensive financial and military aid. This valuable
political and financial relationship maintains the need for the regime to
continue to subdue groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, despite its
apparent legitimisation at the hands of the electorate. As has been noted
previously, European companies are increasingly breaking into the Egyptian
defence market over the last few years, and stronger ties with China could
see the end of dependency on the US.
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