Abstract
Yemen faces a complex and dangerous mix of security problems. Its fiercely
independent tribes have long
been considered an important breeding ground
for al-Qaeda Islamic extremists and North Yemen is the
ancestral homeland
of Osama Bin Laden. The threat from al-Qaeda has intensified over the last
year, with
the September 2008 suicide bomb attack on the US embassy in
Sanaa, which killed 17 people,
underlining the organisation’s
current capabilities. A separate Shiite rebellion has dominated the
northwest with alleged support from Iran – a ceasefire was implemented
in mid-2007 but fighting flared
up again in the first half of 2008. To add
to these challenges, the second half of 2008 saw an increase of
privacy in
the Gulf of Aden. Although primarily the work of Somali clans, the threat to
shipping from
piracy affected Yemen. Separately, there are still tensions
between the North and South that can be traced
back to the brief civil war
of 1994.
Tribesmen also seek to resolve a variety of local disputes over
water, land, roads and electricity supplies
among other things by
kidnapping foreign tourists and negotiating for the their release. In addition
there is
a large supply of weaponry in the country and scant regard for
central authority. While all this could be
described as a security
nightmare, the country in other respects has certain strengths. Since 9/11,
Yemen
has become a close ally in the US government’s ‘war on
terror’ and although subject to authoritarian rule,
in some respects
Yemen offers greater political freedoms than many other Arab governments. A
key
figure in Yemen’s balancing act is of course President Ali
Abdullah Saleh. His grip on power has seemed
as tight as ever, however,
there is an emerging challenge from the opposition parties in the run-up to
the
April 2009 parliamentary elections.
Yemen now enjoys relatively
stable relations with its neighbours following a decade of tensions over
several bilateral territorial disputes, primarily with Saudi Arabia, and
Riyadh is now supportive of the
presidency in Sana’a. However, some
security challenges are presented by internal instability in the
postunification
period. The military remains a favoured recipient of
government investment and procurements
for all three branches of the armed
forces continue despite overwhelming budget constraints and a lack of
trained personnel to use the equipment. It is likely that Yemen will maintain
its military strength and seek
to further modernise specific sectors of
its military to respond to new or existing terrorist threats. Yemen
is
completely dependent upon foreign procurements, as it enjoys no indigenous
defence industry.
Yemen’s total reliance on the procurement of
foreign produced arms forces the government to depend on
a brisk arms
trade, although not so brisk as some of its neighbours. Historically, Yemen
has acquired
Russian and ex-Soviet bloc states for military equipment but
recent signs suggest that Sana’a is seeking to
diversify. The
September 2004 lifting of a US arms embargo on Yemen has allowed entry for US
firms
into the Yemeni market, however, given budgetary restrictions,
procurements have not yet taken place.
Sana’a is stable for the time
being but is under immense financial restraints. Oil production only began
in
Yemen in the 1990s and, while average incomes rose as a result, the
industry only employs a small
percentage of the workforce and has not
succeeded in generating substantial wealth. However, Yemen
maintains a
high level of military expenditure relative to GDP. In 2005, Yemen spent
approximately 7.5%
of its GDP on the military. This trend is unlikely to
change.
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